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PETERSON V. STATE: LIMITATIONS ON DEFENSE CROSS-
EXAMINATION ARE PERMITTED WHEN THE TESTIMONY 
LACKS A FACTUAL FOUNDATION, IS OVERLY 
PREJUDICIAL, OR HAS NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY 
PRESERVED. 
 
By: Meghan E. Ellis 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the defendant’s right to 
confrontation was not violated when the defense was precluded from cross-
examining a witness about hallucinations and his potential sentence prior to 
entering into a plea agreement.  Peterson v. State, 444 Md. 105, 153-54, 118 
A.3d 925, 952-53 (2015).  The court found that the defendant failed to preserve 
the issue of a witness’s expectation of benefit with respect to pending charges, 
and failed to show sufficient factual foundation for a cross-examination 
regarding the expectation.  Id. at 138-39, 118 A.3d at 944.  In addition, the 
court found that, although not protected by attorney-client privilege, exclusion 
of co-defendant’s counsel’s testimony was proper because of its prejudicial 
nature and limited probative value.  Id. at 161-62, 118 A.3d at 957.  
     In March 2009, Calvin Rose (“Rose”) introduced Jerrod Peterson 
(“Peterson”), who was looking to purchase ecstasy, to Domonique Gordon 
(“Gordon”). A week later, Gordon and his friend, James McLaurin 
(“McLaurin”), traveled to Rose’s house with a bag of imitation ecstasy.  
Peterson and his acquaintance, Thomas Hughes (“Hughes”) received a ride to 
Rose’s house from Peterson’s friend, Alexis Brown (“Brown”).  
     Upon arrival, Peterson got into the back seat of Gordon’s car while Hughes 
spoke to Rose outside.  Peterson pulled out a gun and a struggle ensued 
between him, Gordon, and McLaurin.  Peterson shot Gordon and McLaurin 
was also shot as he attempted to flee.  Peterson and Hughes left the scene in 
Brown’s car with the imitation ecstasy pills and money.  Peterson and Hughes 
were arrested a day later and indicted for numerous offenses including felony 
murder. 
     Peterson was convicted of first-degree felony murder and several other 
lesser-included offenses in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.  He 
was sentenced to life in prison, with all but 85 years suspended, including a 
ten-year mandatory minimum.  Peterson appealed his convictions to the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the trial court. 
     Peterson petitioned for certiorari.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted to consider: (1) whether the trial court’s limitations on the cross-
examination of Rose and Hughes violated Peterson’s constitutional right of 
confrontation or otherwise constituted an abuse of its discretion; and (2) 
whether the trial court’s determination of attorney-client privilege properly 
precluded Hughes’ counsel from being summoned as a defense witness. 
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   The court of appeals began its analysis by considering the policy reasons of 
the right to confront and the standard of review.  Peterson, 444 Md. at 122, 
118 A.3d at 934.  The right to confront allows the defendant to cross-examine 
witnesses in order to determine their biases, interests, or motives.  Id.  The trial 
court may limit the scope of cross-examination for various reasons including 
eliminating harassment, prejudice, or confusion among the jury.  Id. at 122-
23, 118 A.3d at 935.   
     Peterson argued that the question of unconstitutional limits on cross-
examination required a de novo standard of review based on “the exclusion of 
an area of inquiry.”  Peterson, 444 Md. at 123, 118 A.3d at 935.  The court 
rejected this argument instead of adopting an abuse of discretion standard 
because under Maryland Rule 5-611, a trial court may make a variety of 
judgments in the course of a witness examination.  Id. at 124, 118 A.3d at 935.  
However, where there is an alleged violation of the Confrontation Clause, the 
court must consider the cumulative result of these judgments.  Id. at 124, 118 
A.3d at 935-36.  The court also considered whether the defense properly 
preserved the issue for appeal.  Id. at 124-25, 118 A.3d at 936.    
     In order to adequately preserve an issue for appeal, the petitioning party 
must show both prejudice and evidence that the issue was raised at trial.  
Peterson, 444 Md. at 125, 118 A.3d at 936; see also Md. Rule 5-103(a)(2).  
The court then applied this standard to the merits of Peterson’s claims.  Id. at 
126-27, 118 A.3d at 937.  Specifically, the court addressed the trial court’s 
limitations on his cross-examination of Rose’s expectation of benefit with 
respect to charges pending against him.  Id. 
     Pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-609, witnesses may be impeached with 
evidence of certain types of convictions; however, the statute is limited to final 
convictions.  Peterson, 444 Md. at 134-35, 118 A.3d at 941-42.  Cross-
examination regarding pending charges is permissible with respect to whether 
or not a witness expects some benefit in exchange for his testimony.  Id. at 
135, 118 A.3d at 942; see also Md. Rule 5-616(a)(4).  The court may limit the 
cross-examination if the testimony is overly prejudicial and not probative.  Id. 
at 136, 118 A.3d at 942. 
     The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the pending 
charges were not admissible.  Peterson, 444 Md. at 141, 118 A.3d at 945.  As 
an initial matter, the court found that Peterson failed to preserve the issue on 
appeal.  Id.  The court also found that Peterson lacked a sufficient factual 
foundation for questions concerning an expectation of benefit, since pending 
charges alone are not adequate.  Id. at 141, 118 A.3d at 945-46. 
     Peterson argued that his right to confrontation was limited with respect to 
his cross-examination of Hughes regarding the sentence Hughes faced prior to 
executing Hughes’ plea agreement.  Peterson, 444 Md. at 149, 118 A.3d at 
950.  The trial court found that through cross-examination of Hughes, defense 
counsel elicited information including his maximum sentence under the plea 
agreement and his sentencing date. Id. at 152-53, 118 A.3d at 952.  The court 
also found that knowing Hughes’ potential sentence would prejudice the jury 
and outweighed the probative value of the inquiry.  Id. at 153, 118 A.3d at 952.  
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland found that the extensive cross-examination 
of Hughes constituted a sufficient level of inquiry under the Confrontation 
Clause.  Id. at 154, 118 A.3d at 952-53. Additionally, the court of appeals 
determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the 
questions regarding hallucinations due to a lack of a factual predicate. Id. at 
148-49, 118 A.3d at 949-50. 
     Finally, at trial, Peterson sought the testimony of Hughes’ counsel, Bethany 
Skopp, (“Skopp”) regarding the proffer session.  Peterson, 444 Md. at 158, 
118 A.3d at 955.  The court of appeals held that the trial court had properly 
excluded Skopp’s testimony, not on the assertion of attorney-client privilege, 
but on the grounds that the testimony sought was irrelevant or, in any event, 
outweighed by other considerations.  Id. at 161, 118 A.3d at 957.  The court 
further held that Skopp’s testimony would have been cumulative of previous 
witness testimony and would not have cast doubt on Hughes’ credibility.  Id. 
at 162, 118 A.3d at 957.   
     In Peterson, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court has 
broad discretion in limiting the defense’s cross-examination.  In assessing 
whether these limitations, in aggregate, violate the Confrontation Clause, the 
limitations will always be reviewed against previously admitted testimony and 
evidence.  The court’s ruling runs the risk of severely limiting defense cross-
examinations.  As a safeguard, Maryland practitioners should establish a 
factual basis on the record for all testimony and raise the issue of erroneous 
rulings to the trial court, thus adequately preserving any issue for appeal.  If 
Maryland practitioners fail to do so, the defendant’s constitutional right to 
confrontation may be jeopardized and may have a detrimental effect at the 
appellate stage. 
 
